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The Regulatory Choice of Noncompliance in Emissions Trading Programs 
 
1. Introduction 
By exploiting the power of a market to allocate pollution control responsibilities, well-
designed emissions trading programs promise to achieve environmental quality goals more 
cheaply than traditional command-and-control regulations. It is obvious though that the full 
potential of emissions trading cannot materialize if these programs are not enforced well. In 
recognition of this fact, a sizable theoretical literature exists that examines the consequences of 
noncompliance and the design of enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs. There 
is, however, a significant omission in this literature—there is no published work that examines 
what the level of noncompliance should be for emissions trading programs. To fill this gap, this 
paper addresses the following question: To achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-
effectively, should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full 
compliance, or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching 
the emissions target?   
Authors of papers in literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions trading policies 
often assume that enforcement is not, or cannot be sufficient to induce full compliance [Malik 
(1990, 2002), Keeler (1991), van Egteren and Weber (1996), Stranlund and Dhanda (1999), 
Montero (2002)]. Others restrict their analyses to full-compliance outcomes [Malik (1992), 
Stranlund and Chavez (2000), Chavez and Stranlund (2003)]. In practice we find examples of 
emissions trading programs with significant noncompliance as well as examples with near-
perfect compliance.  Montero, Sanchez, and Katz (2002) argue that the development of an 
emissions trading program for total suspended particulates in Santiago, Chile has been hampered 
  2 
by weak enforcement and significant noncompliance. On the other hand, several EPA emissions 
trading programs like the SO2 Allowance Trading and the NOX Budget Trading programs were 
clearly designed to achieve very high rates of compliance and have been successful in achieving 
this goal [US EPA 2004a, 2004b]. 
The model of this paper assumes that a regulator chooses a supply of emissions permits and 
monitoring to check individual firms for noncompliance to minimize the expected costs of 
inducing a fixed aggregate emissions target. Given a penalty schedule for emissions in excess of 
permit holdings, the supply of permits and the distribution of monitoring determine individual 
violation levels. The expected costs of an emissions trading program include not only the firms’ 
aggregate abatement costs and the government’s monitoring costs, but also the expected costs of 
sanctioning noncompliant firms. The expected costs of sanctioning violations have been ignored 
in the literature on enforcing emissions trading policies. Not only is the assumption that 
penalizing firms is costly a realistic one, it is also an important determinant of the results of this 
paper.
1    
Unlike much of the literature on optimal law enforcement (see Polinsky and Shavell (2000) 
for a review), this work is not concerned with choosing optimal penalty ‘levels’, mainly to avoid 
focusing attention on the common, but not entirely informative result that penalties should be set 
as high as possible. Instead the analysis focuses on the choice of penalty structure; that is, we 
will examine the relative merits of employing an increasing marginal penalty or a constant 
marginal penalty.   
                                                 
1 The policy objective of minimizing the costs of achieving an arbitrary environmental target has always been an 
important objective for analysts and policy makers alike. Montgomery’s (1972) seminal work on the efficiency 
of competitive emissions trading takes this approach. The result that competitive emissions trading minimizes the 
aggregate abatement costs of reaching an aggregate emissions target is perhaps the main justification for 
proposing and implementing emissions markets. This paper extends the long line of inquiry into the cost-
effective design of environmental policies by including the costs of enforcement in the policy objective.  
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Under common assumptions in the literature on compliance under emissions trading 
policies—competitive permit markets and risk neutral firms that always hold a positive number 
of permits—this paper provides several new results that have important implications for 
designing and enforcing emissions trading policies. With a given increasing marginal penalty 
schedule, a simple condition involving the relative marginal costs of monitoring and collecting 
penalties determines whether the cost-effective level of noncompliance is zero or positive. The 
fundamental trade-off in this setting is between allowing greater violations to conserve 
monitoring costs and inducing greater compliance to reduce the expected costs of collecting 
penalties. However, this trade-off does not exist when a constant marginal penalty is employed 
and firms are motivated to hold a positive number of permits. In this case, it is not possible to 
increase violations to reduce monitoring, because the amount of monitoring necessary to induce 
the aggregate emissions standard is fixed. This implies that minimizing the expected costs of 
achieving an aggregate emissions standard requires eliminating the costs of sanctioning 
noncompliant firms. That is, full compliance by all firms is cost-effective when a constant 
marginal penalty is employed.  
These results suggest that a positive amount of noncompliance is only cost-effective if 
violations are punished with an increasing marginal penalty. Thus, the regulatory choice of 
noncompliance rests on a comparison of the costs of a policy with an increasing marginal penalty 
that allows for some noncompliance and a policy that induces full compliance with a constant 
marginal penalty. The resolution of this comparison is straightforward: a policy that achieves an 
aggregate emissions target with an increasing marginal penalty and that allows some 
noncompliance is more expensive than an alternative policy involving full compliance and a 
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constant marginal penalty.
2 This last result does not depend on setting an arbitrarily high 
constant marginal penalty. In fact, the marginal penalty need not be higher than the equilibrium 
marginal penalty under the policy with the increasing marginal penalty, and can actually be 
lower.  
The cost-effectiveness of full compliance may run counter to one’s intuition, and some may 
be surprised by this conclusion. Many of the papers in the literature on compliance and 
enforcement of emissions trading programs—indeed most of the much larger literature on 
optimal law enforcement—have focused on imperfect compliance. Some authors assume that 
enforcement resources are simply insufficient to induce full compliance. For example, Stranlund 
and Dhanda (1999) examine the choice of enforcement strategy by a budget-constrained enforcer 
who does not have sufficient resources to induce full compliance.
3  While limited enforcement 
resources are certainly a factor in many real instances of environmental policy enforcement, the 
main result of this paper suggests that in designing an emissions trading program to achieve an 
aggregate emissions target, regulators should allocate sufficient enforcement resources to 
achieve full compliance. 
Another common assumption that is used to preclude full compliance outcomes is that 
penalties are restricted to be no more than some maximum level. For example, Polinsky and 
Shavell (2000) motivate their review of the literature on the economics of law enforcement with 
a standard model that assumes that the penalty for a violation is less than the benefit that some in 
                                                 
2 There is no work in the literature that compares the efficiency properties of alternative penalty schedules for 
emissions trading policies. Keeler (1991) provides a positive comparison of emissions trading to emissions 
standards under exogenous enforcement strategies that involve increasing, constant, and decreasing marginal 
penalties. In contrast, this paper is concerned with deriving endogenous enforcement strategies and the 
determination of whether marginal penalties should be increasing or constant. Decreasing marginal penalties are 
not considered in this paper. 
3 Garvie and Keeler (1994) assume this objective in their analysis of enforcing emissions standards, and Macho-
Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2005) assume the same in their analysis of enforcing emissions taxes.  
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a population receive from a violation. Obviously, with this assumption full compliance is not 
possible.  Although no upper bound is placed on penalties in this paper, the cost-effectiveness of 
full compliance and a constant marginal penalty does not depend on the freedom to choose an 
arbitrarily high marginal penalty. All that is required to make sure that full compliance is a 
regulatory option is that marginal penalties exceed the prevailing price for emissions permits.
4  
The cost-effectiveness of a constant marginal penalty may also be surprising to some, given 
that such a penalty is not common in the literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions 
trading programs. Interestingly, constant marginal penalties appear to be much more common for 
actual and proposed emissions trading programs than in the literature.
5   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Since the analysis of this work involves a standard 
regulatory model in which the government chooses a policy to which the firms react, section 2 
first characterizes firms’ emissions and violation choices, given an increasing marginal penalty, a 
monitoring strategy and a supply of permits. Section 3 then characterizes the government choices 
of monitoring and permit supply (which together determine violation levels), given an increasing 
marginal penalty schedule.  The analysis turns to a constant marginal penalty in Section 4, where 
the cost-effectiveness of a constant marginal penalty and full compliance over any policy 
involving an increasing marginal penalty and noncompliance is established. Several issues that 
arise with incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs are discussed in section 5. Tying 
                                                 
4 Analysts and policymakers alike stress the importance of making sure that marginal penalties exceed the price of 
permits (US EPA 2003a). For example, noncompliance in the SO2 Allowance trading program is penalized with 
a constant marginal penalty that has always been many times higher than going allowance prices.  The penalty 
was set at $2,000 per ton of emissions in excess of allowances in 1990 dollars, while allowance prices have 
rarely risen above $200 (US EPA 2004a).   
5 See Boemare and Quirion (2002) for examples. There is quite a lot of variation in how actual constant marginal 
penalties are set. The SO2 Allowance program employs a fixed (in real terms) financial penalty. The EPA’s 
recent Clear Skies proposal calls for a unit penalty that is three times the clearing price in the most recent auction 
of permits (US EPA 2003b). Many policies employ an offset penalty whereby a firm’s excess emissions in one 
period are deducted from its allocation of permits in the next period. The SO2 and Clear Skies programs include a 
one-to-one offset to complement the financial penalties of these programs.  The US EPA’s Ozone Transport 
Commission NOx Budget Program employs a 3-to-1 offset as its primary penalty for noncompliance.  
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the marginal penalty to the prevailing permit price allows the regulator to meet its environmental 
target cost-effectively without any information about the firms’ abatement costs. However, 
dealing with uncertain abatement costs when the policy goal is to choose the optimal 
environmental target is not as straightforward.  Section 6 concludes.    
 
2. Individual Choices under an Increasing Marginal Penalty 
The analysis of this paper is based on a standard model of compliance in emissions trading 
programs.
6 Throughout consider a fixed set of n heterogeneous, risk-neutral firms. A summary of 
the costs of all the methods firm i can use to reduce its emissions is given by its abatement cost 
function, ci(ei), which is strictly decreasing and convex in its emissions ei. The firm is allocated 
 emissions permits initially and chooses to hold l
0
i l i permits. Each permit confers the legal right 
to release one unit of emissions. Assume competitive behavior in the permit market so that all 
trades take place at a constant price p. The analysis throughout is static.
7
A regulator has perfect knowledge of each firm’s permit holding, but cannot observe 
emissions without a costly audit.  Let πi denote the probability that the regulator is able to make a 
determination of i’s compliance status. Let us assume, like most other analysts, that monitoring 
produces a measure of emissions that is accurate enough to judge a firm’s compliance status 
without error.  The detection probability is common knowledge and the regulator commits itself 
to it at the outset. If a firm is noncompliant, its emissions exceed the number of permits it holds 
and its violation is vi = ei – li > 0. If a firm is compliant, ei – li ≤ 0 and vi = 0. Violations are 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that the model of this paper can easily be applied to other tradable property rights programs. 
Recent papers by Hatcher (2005) and Chavez and Salgado (2005) are direct applications of the literature on 
compliance and enforcement of emissions trading to individual transferable fishing quotas. Thus, the results of 
this paper apply in this context as well. 
7 Stranlund, Costello, and Chavez (2005) examine dynamic enforcement of emissions trading programs that allow 
various forms of permit banking and borrowing. They do not address the regulatory choice of noncompliance, 
choosing instead to focus on designing enforcement strategies that guarantee full compliance.  
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penalized according to a quadratic penalty function,   where 
2 () / 2 , ii i fv v v φγ =+ 0 φ >  and 
0. γ >  When the analysis turns to a constant marginal penalty schedule in section 4, γ  will be 
set to zero.   
Assume that the intercept of the marginal penalty schedule, φ , is greater than the equilibrium 
price of permits. This assumption allows full compliance to be a possible outcome throughout 
the paper. No upper bound on marginal penalties is imposed, but none of the results of this paper 
rely on setting arbitrarily high penalties. 
 Assuming throughout that each firm chooses positive emissions, firm i’s objective is  
 
   ( )
02
(,) min ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) /2
subject to  0,  0.
ii el i i i i i i i i i
ii i
ce p l l e l e l
el l
πφ γ +− + − +−
−≥ ≥
   [1] 
 
Restricting the firm to   follows from the fact that a firm will never have an incentive to 
be over-compliant.
0 ii el −≥
8  Letting   denote the Lagrange equation for [1] and  L i λ  denote the multiplier 
attached to the constraint  , the first-order conditions for a solution to [1] are:  0 ii el −≥
   () [ ( ) ] 0 ; ei i i i i i ce e l π φγ λ ′ =+ + − − = L       [ 2 ]  
[ ( )] 0, 0,  0; lii i i i l i pe l l l   π φγ λ =− + − +≥ ≥ = LL     [3] 
   () 0 ,   0 ,   () ii i i ii el el λ 0 . λ λ =− − ≤ ≥ − = L      [4] 
 
Because the constraint  is linear and the firm’s objective is strictly convex when the 
penalty function is strictly convex, these conditions are necessary and sufficient to identify 
unique optimal choices of emissions, permit demand, and violation level. 
0 ii el −≥
                                                 
8 If   then the firm could reduce its abatement costs by allowing its emissions to increase to l , ii el < i without 
incurring any costs.   
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Throughout I assume that enforcement is sufficient to induce each firm to hold a positive 
number of emissions permits. Then, [3] holds with equality and combining equations [2] and [3] 
yields   which uniquely determines the firm’s choice of emissions. Note that this 
decision rule is independent of the enforcement strategy the firm faces, and thus holds whether 
the marginal penalty is increasing or constant.  Since each firm chooses its emissions so that its 
marginal abatement cost is equal to the going permit price, the permit market will equalize firms’ 
marginal abatement costs. Consequently, whatever level of aggregate emissions results in 
equilibrium, the aggregate abatement costs of reaching that level of emissions are minimized. 
Furthermore, in equilibrium the permit price is equal to the aggregate marginal abatement cost 
function at the resulting level of aggregate emissions. These results are contained in the 
following lemma. Since the results are well known, the lemma is offered without proof. Note that 
the lemma holds regardless of whether the marginal penalty is increasing or constant.  
( ) 0, ii ce p ′ +=
 
Lemma 1: Each firm chooses its emissions so that  ( ) 0. ii ce p ′ + =  Consequently, in equilibrium, 
() , p CE ′ =−  where E is aggregate emissions and  
         [ 5 ]  
{}
11









Lemma 1 is an important result, for the analysis of emissions trading programs generally, and 
for this work in particular. That a competitive permit market leads to a distribution of emissions 
that minimizes the aggregate abatement costs of reaching an aggregate emissions target has 
always been one of the main reasons for proposing market-based policies to control pollution. 
For this work, as long as Lemma 1 holds and an aggregate emissions standard is achieved, 
alternative policies all have the same minimized aggregate abatement costs. This allows the 
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regulatory choice of noncompliance to be focused solely on minimizing the expected 
enforcement costs of inducing the aggregate standard.  
Apart from the assumption of competitive permit trading, two assumptions guarantee that 
Lemma 1 holds throughout this work.
9 The first is that each firm holds a positive number of 
permits. Using [2] and [3] it is straightforward to show that a firm that holds no permits chooses 
its emissions so that  ( ). ii p ce ′ ≥−  If this inequality is strict for some firms, then the marginal 
abatement costs of the firms will not be equalized and aggregate abatement costs will not be 
minimized. In section 4, I briefly discuss the possibility that a policy may require that some firms 
hold zero permits, but that possibility appears rather remote. One may also wonder whether a 
real firm would ever hold zero permits, given that this would send such an obvious signal of 
noncompliance to the regulator. 
The other assumption that is necessary for Lemma 1 to hold is that firms do not have 
subjective evaluations of their detection probabilities that depend on their emissions choices and 
permit holdings. Malik (1990) has shown that if a noncompliant firm’s subjective probability of 
detection is  ( , ) ii i el π , with  0 ii i i el π π ∂∂ + ∂∂ ≠ , then it chooses its emissions so that its 
marginal abatement cost differs from the permit price. If this is the case, then it is unlikely that 
the firms’ marginal abatement costs will be equal and that aggregate abatement costs will be 
minimized. This is the reason that the objective detection probabilities, as determined by the 
government’s monitoring efforts, are assumed to be common knowledge in this paper. 
Now let us turn to the compliance decision. Under the assumption that each firm holds a 
positive number of permits, equation [3] holds with equality. Substituting vi = ei – li into [3], it is 
                                                 
9 The lemma will not hold in the presence of market power or transaction costs.  See van Egteren and Weber (1996), 
Malik (2002), and Chavez and Stranlund (2003) for analyses of compliance and enforcement of emissions 
trading programs in the presence of market power. Chavez and Stranlund (2004) analyze compliance and 
enforcement in the presence of transaction costs. 
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straightforward to show that a firm’s violation choice is  () ii i vp π φπ γ = − / i p π φ ≤  if  , and is 
zero if  / i p π φ ≥ .  However, we can restrict the analysis to cases in which  / i p π φ ≤ , because it 
will never be optimal to monitor a firm so that  / . i p π φ >   In this case the regulator could reduce 
its monitoring effort without changing the firm’s decision to be fully compliant. Given / i p π φ ≤ , 
therefore, invert  () ii vp i π φπ γ =−  to obtain the detection probability necessary to induce 
violation vi from firm i; that is,  ( ) /( ). ii i vp v π φγ = +  Note that since the permit price and the 
parameters of the penalty schedule do not vary across firms, the function  ( ) ii v π  does not vary 
across firms. Our results about a firm’s violation decision are summarized in the following 
lemma.  
 
Lemma 2: Given a linearly increasing marginal penalty, provided that  / i p π φ ≤  and i holds a 
positive number of permits, its violation choice is  () ii vp i π φπ γ = − . To induce a violation vi, 
the regulator must monitor i so that it’s detection probability is  ( ) /( ). ii vp v π φγ = +  
 
Note that a firm’s violation choice depends only the permit price and the enforcement 
variables, not on its abatement costs. For this reason, Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) have argued 
that a budget-constrained regulator that seeks to minimize the aggregate violations of 
heterogeneous risk neutral firms cannot use differences in the firms’ abatement costs to target its 
monitoring effort. The reason is that each firm’s emissions and violation decisions are keyed to 
the permit price so that, at the margin, there are no differences among them that an enforcer can 
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exploit.
 10 This result also plays an important role in the determination of the cost-effective levels 
of noncompliance in emissions trading programs. 
 
3. The Regulatory Choice of Noncompliance with an Increasing Marginal Penalty 
We are now ready to characterize a cost-effective emission trading policy that is enforced 
with a linearly increasing marginal penalty. The regulatory objective is to minimize the sum of 
aggregate abatement costs, aggregate monitoring costs, and the expected costs of collecting 
penalties from noncompliant firms, while holding aggregate emissions to a pre-specified target 
E . The instruments available to the regulator are detection probabilities  / i p π φ ≤ , i = 1, …, n, 
and the aggregate supply of permits L.   
As noted in the previous section, Lemma 1 simplifies the regulator’s problem. To make sure 
that aggregate emissions are equal to the target the regulator must induce the fixed permit price 
() p CE ′ =− . Competitive permit trading minimizes the aggregate abatement costs of holding 
aggregate emissions to E , so the regulator only needs to minimize the expected enforcement 
costs of achieving the emissions target. Rather than choosing individual detection probabilities 
and the supply of permits, it is analytically more convenient to choose individual violation levels, 
 The violation levels then determine the detection probabilities  , 1 , , . i vi n
∗ = …
() / ( ) ,  1 , , , ii vp v i πφ γ
∗∗ =+ = … n  and the supply of permits 
1 .
n
i i LE v
∗ ∗
= =− ∑  
Note that, because the regulator must induce the permit price  () p CE ′ =− , we must assume 
that it has complete information about the aggregate marginal abatement cost function. This 
                                                 
10 This conclusion does not hold if firms face fixed emissions standards, because the marginal productivity of 
increased enforcement in reducing violations tends to be higher for firms that have higher marginal abatement 
costs or who face lower emissions standards (Garvie and Keeler 1994). Murphy and Stranlund (2005) use 
emissions trading laboratory experiments to test and confirm the hypothesis that firms’ violations choices are 
independent of their abatement costs.   
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assumption is maintained through the analysis. However, in section 5 we will see that tying the 
marginal penalty directly to the prevailing permit price allows the regulator to achieve the 
emissions target cost-effectively despite its uncertainty about the aggregate abatement cost 
function.  
Now turn to the regulator’s expected enforcement costs. Suppose that the cost of monitoring 
firm i is  ( ), i v µπ  where µ  is a positive constant that does not vary across firms. (I will discuss 
the consequences of relaxing the assumption of identical monitoring cost functions at the end of 
this section). Using  () / ( ) i vp v i π φγ =+ , aggregate monitoring costs are  












== ⎜ + ⎝⎠ ∑∑ … ⎟
                                                
     [6] 
It is clear that aggregate monitoring costs are monotonically decreasing in a firm’s violation. 
This is due to the fact that allowing a higher violation by a firm is accomplished by monitoring it 
less closely.  
In the literature on the economics of law enforcement it is usually assumed that penalties are 
imposed without cost.
11 In this case, however, because monitoring costs are decreasing in the 
firms’ violations, assuming costless sanctions would lead us to conclude that a cost-effective 
emissions trading policy would involve maximum violations. This literally suggests setting the 
aggregate supply of permits equal to zero and eliminating the permit market altogether. Then, 
each firm would face a zero emissions standard and an expected penalty for each unit of 
pollution it releases.
 12  In reality, however, penalizing firms is likely to be costly. Sanctioning 
 
11 However, see Polinsky and Shavell (1992) for an analysis of how sanctioning costs affect optimal law 
enforcement. I model the expected costs of collecting penalties in the same way as Polinksy and Shavell.  
12 This is similar to a result obtained by Arguedas and Hamoudi (2004). They show that the optimal emissions 
standard for a single firm is zero when violations to this standard are punished with an increasing marginal 
penalty and sanctions are costless. 
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costs will certainly include the administrative costs associated with imposing and collecting 
penalties. These costs could also include the potentially more substantial costs of government 
investigations to generate enough evidence to convince a court of a firm’s liability, as well as the 
social costs of firms’ efforts to challenge or avoid the imposition of penalties. 
Let β  be the per-dollar cost of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Since the 
expected penalty for firm i is   expected aggregate sanctioning costs are 
 Substituting 
2 () ( / 2 ) , ii i vv v πφ γ +
2
1 1 (, , ) () ( / 2 ) .
n
ni i i Sv v v v v βπ φ γ
















= ⎜ + ⎝⎠ ∑ … ⎟
                                                
    [7] 
Allowing individual violations to increase produces countervailing effects on expected 
sanctioning costs. Holding a firm’s detection probability constant, obviously expected 
sanctioning costs would increase if it chooses a higher violation. However, allowing a firm’s 
violation to increase is accomplished by reducing the detection probability, which implies a 
decrease in expected sanctioning costs. It is straightforward to demonstrate that the former effect 
dominates the latter so that expected sanctioning costs are increasing in individual violations. 
Since aggregate monitoring costs are decreasing in individual violations, the regulatory choice of 




13 Simple forms for monitoring costs and the expected costs of sanctioning firms are used to ease the analysis and to 
highlight the essential aspects of the regulator’s choice of noncompliance. These cost functions can be 
generalized substantially without affecting the main results of this paper. All that is required is that monitoring 
costs are decreasing and expected sanctioning costs are increasing in individual violations, the sum of the two 
costs are strictly convex, and if any two firms have the same violation, then their marginal monitoring costs are 
equal as are their marginal expected sanctioning costs.  
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Let TE denote total expected enforcement costs. Since Lemma 1 guarantees that the permit 
market will minimize aggregate abatement costs, the cost-effective distribution of violations is 
the solution to:  
1 11 1 () m i n    ( ,,) ( ,,) ( ,,)




T E vvM vv S vv
vi n
= n = +
≥=
…… …
    [8] 
 
Note that no upper bound on individual violations is specified. This is because we have already 
precluded the possibility that it might be optimal to choose an individual violation level such that 
a firm holds no permits. Given this assumption, possible solutions to the regulator’s problem are 
characterized in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 1: Given a linearly increasing marginal penalty and the regulatory objective of 
minimizing the sum of the firms’ abatement costs and the expected enforcement costs of holding 
aggregate emissions to an exogenous standard E : 
(1) If 
2 , βφγ µ ≥  then   for each i = 1,2,…,n. Furthermore,  0 i v
∗ = LE
∗ =  and  / p π φ
∗ =  for each i 
= 1,2,…,n.    
(2) If 
2 , βφγ µ <  then  
()
1/2 21 / 2
1/2
2
0, 1,2,..., . i vv i n
γµ βφ β φ
βγ
∗∗ −−
== > =     [9] 
Furthermore, LE n v
∗∗ =−  and  () / ( ) vp v π πφ γ
∗ ∗ == +
∗  for each i = 1,2,…,n.    
 
Proof: Again, individual violations need to only minimize expected enforcement costs, because 
the permit market itself minimizes aggregate abatement costs.  Using [6] and [7], the first-order 
condition for the determination of the cost-effective violation by firm i can be written as   











TE v TE v v
v
βφ µγ β φγ γ
φγ
−+ +
∂∂ = ≥ ∂∂ =
+
 [10] 
To demonstrate part (1) of the proposition note that if 
2 , βφγ µ ≥  then  0 i TE v ∂ ∂> for   
which implies   Moreover, observe that the condition 
0, i v >
0. i v
∗ =
2 βφγ ≥ µ  only involves the 
parameters of the penalty function and the unit sanctioning and monitoring costs, which do not 
vary across firms. Therefore, if 
2 βφγ ≥ µ , then full compliance is required of each firm. Since 
the cost-effective policy does not allow noncompliance, the aggregate supply of permits is equal 
to the aggregate emissions standard. Finally, using  () / ( ) , i vp v i π φγ = +  monitoring should 
generate the detection probabilities,  /, p π φ
∗ =  for each  1,2,..., , in =  
Turning to part (2) of the proposition, if 
2 , βφγ µ <  then  0 i TE v ∂ ∂< for   This implies 
that   and the first-order condition [10] holds with equality.  That is, 
 The sole positive root of this quadratic equation is given by 
[9]. Note that this solution involves the parameters of the penalty function, and the unit 
sanctioning and monitoring costs, none of which vary across the firms. Therefore, individual 
violations are uniform across firms; that is,   Since aggregate violations are 
 the aggregate supply of permits is 




2 () / 20 ii vv βφ µγ β φγ γ −+ + = )
2 .
,  1,2, , . i vv i n
∗∗ == …
, nv
∗ . LE n v
∗ ∗ =−  Lastly, since individual violations are the 
same, the detection probability  () / ( ) vp v π φγ
∗ =+
∗ is also the same for all firms. The proof of 
part (2) of the proposition is completed by confirming that the second order condition for a 
solution to [1] holds. The second derivative of TE with respect to i’s violation evaluated at  i v
∗ is 
() ()
3 22 2 2 i TE v p v γγ µβ φ φ γ ∂∂ = − + , i  which is positive given 
2 . βφγ µ <  Since all the cross 
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partial derivatives of TE are zero, expected enforcement costs are strictly convex at  ,  i = 





Proposition 1 reveals that with an increasing marginal penalty function, whether the cost-
effective level of noncompliance is zero or positive depends on the costs of collecting penalties, 
monitoring costs and the parameters of the penalty function; that is on the relationship between 
2 and  . βφγ µ  If marginal monitoring costs,µ , are relatively high, then the solution calls for a 
certain amount of noncompliance to conserve monitoring costs. If marginal sanctioning costs, 
β ,  are high, then the solution calls for more intense monitoring to induce perfect compliance to 
eliminate the expected costs of collecting penalties.  
Clearly, a distinctive feature of cost-effective noncompliance with an increasing marginal 
penalty is that violations are uniform across the firms. There are two reasons for this result. First, 
as noted earlier, firms’ equilibrium violation choices are independent of their abatement costs. 
Thus, if they all face the same penalty schedule and are monitored at the same level, they will all 
choose the same violation. In fact, uniform monitoring is cost-effective as long as the marginal 
costs of monitoring and applying sanctions are the same for each firm. It is straightforward to 
demonstrate that if marginal monitoring and sanctioning costs vary across firms and if the cost-
effective policy calls for positive violations by all firms, then the firms with higher marginal 
monitoring costs or lower marginal sanctioning costs will have higher violations. It is also 
possible that the optimal policy would involve a mix of compliant and noncompliant firms. That 
firms’ violations will not be uniform when the marginal enforcement cost parameters are not 
uniform suggests a targeted monitoring strategy in which firms with lower marginal monitoring 
costs or higher marginal sanctioning costs are monitored more closely. It is important to reiterate, 
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however, that the justification for a targeted strategy cannot be based on differences in firms’ 
costs of controlling their emissions. Rather, the justification must come from differences in the 
costs of detecting violations or in the costs of applying sanctions. A rigorous analysis of the 
causes and consequences of heterogeneous costs of monitoring and sanctioning may be a fruitful 
area for future research.
14  
 
4. The Cost-Effectiveness of a Constant Marginal Penalty and Full Compliance. 
Having characterized the regulatory choice of noncompliance with an increasing marginal 
penalty, we now turn to this choice when a constant marginal penalty is employed. Suppose that 
violations are punished with a constant marginal penalty  . φ  To guarantee that full compliance is 
an option assume that  p φ <  and continue to assume that each firm holds a positive number of 
permits. Modifying the first-order conditions for a firm’s choices of emissions and permit 
demand, [2-4], to incorporate the constant marginal penalty and the assumption of non-zero 
permit holdings yields: 
   () 0 ; ei i i i ce π φλ ′ =+ − = L        [ 1 0 ]  
0;  li i p π φλ =− += L         [ 1 1 ]  
   () 0 ,   0 ,   () ii i i ii el el λ 0 . λ λ =− − ≤ ≥ − = L      [ 1 2 ]  
 
Combining equations [10] and [11] yields  ( ) 0. ii ce p ′ + =  Thus, under the assumption that 
each firm holds a positive number of permits, Lemma 1 of section 2 holds. That is, the permit 
market minimizes aggregate abatement costs so the regulatory choice of noncompliance is 
                                                 
14 The possibility that the marginal costs of monitoring may differ among firms is related to the idea that the 
government may be able to detect the violations of some individuals more easily than others. Bebchuk and 
Kaplow (1993) were the first to examine heterogeneous probabilities of apprehension in the determination of 
optimal law enforcement. A recent paper by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2005) assume heterogeneous 
probabilities of apprehension in their study of enforcing emissions taxes. 
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simply a matter of minimizing the expected enforcement costs of achieving the emissions target. 
To guarantee that aggregate emissions are equal to the target E , the regulator must induce the 
fixed permit price  () p CE ′ =− .  
Equation [11] makes it clear that to induce emissions choices so that  () 0 ii ce p ′ +=  for each i, 
the detection probability that each firm faces must satisfy  . i p π φ ≤  In fact, given that  i p π φ ≤  for 
each firm, a monitoring strategy involving  i p π φ <  for some firm involves higher monitoring 
costs than are necessary. To see why, imagine an equilibrium in which  j ji l
≠ ∑  permits are held 
by all firms other than firm i. If  i p π φ < , then i chooses its emissions so that  () 0 ii ce p ′ += , and 
[11] and [12] imply that its demand for permits is  ; ii le =  that is, it is fully compliant. Of course, 
equilibrium in the permit market requires  . i ji lL l
≠ =− j ∑  Monitoring of firm i is inefficient 
because it can be reduced so that  i p π φ =  without affecting any of the firms’ choices. With 
, i p π φ =  firm i continues to choose its emissions so that  () 0 ii ce p ′ + = , but it is now indifferent 
about the number of permits it holds in the half-closed interval (0, ei]. However, the reduction in 
the detection probability of i does not change any of the decisions of the other firms, in particular 
they continue to hold the same number of permits. The permit market clears if firm i also holds 
the same number of permits,    . ii le =
Since any policy involving i p π φ <  for some i cannot be optimal, the detection probabilities 
are  / i p π φ =  for each firm.  With monitoring set in this way, each firm is indifferent about how 
many permits it holds, which implies that all individual violations are indeterminate as well.  
However, aggregate violations are determined uniquely by the initial allocation of permits. That 
is, with an initial allocation LE ≤  and the detection probability  / p π φ =  applied to each firm, 
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aggregate emissions will equal E  and aggregate noncompliance is equal to  . EL −  Note that total 
monitoring costs are  /. nn p µπµ = φ  Since this is a constant it is not possible to reduce 
monitoring effort by increasing the amount of noncompliance. In the case of an increasing 
marginal penalty we identified a tradeoff between light monitoring and positive violations to 
conserve monitoring costs and more intense monitoring and full compliance to conserve 
sanctioning costs. This tradeoff does not exist when a constant marginal penalty is employed—
the only way to minimize expected enforcement costs in this case is to induce full compliance to 
eliminate the expected costs of collecting penalties. Given the monitoring required to reach the 
target, this is accomplished simply by setting the supply of permits equal to the aggregate 
emissions target. The preceding analysis proves the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2: Given a constant marginal penalty , p φ ≥  to minimize the sum of the firms’ 
abatement costs and the expected enforcement costs of holding aggregate emissions to an 
exogenous standardE , each firm is monitored so that  / p π φ
∗ =  and the supply of permits is 
; LE
∗ =  that is, the cost-effective level of noncompliance is zero. 
 
The cost-effectiveness of full compliance under a constant marginal penalty depends on the 
assumption that all firms hold a positive number of permits. While this assumption is maintained 
throughout this work, it is worthwhile to briefly consider, at least qualitatively, whether the full 
compliance equilibrium can be improved upon by a policy that is designed so that a subset of 
firms hold zero permits, and hence, are fully noncompliant. Start with a full compliance 
equilibrium and imagine reducing the monitoring of a subset of firms. These firms will sell off 
all of their permits because the permit price exceeds the expected marginal penalty they face. 
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Moreover, they will increase their emissions, because the expected marginal penalty is lower.  
Holding aggregate emissions to the target, therefore, requires that the emissions of the other 
firms must fall.  To accomplish this the supply of permits is reduced to just cover the emissions 
of these firms and they are monitored so that they are fully compliant. Since these firms choose 
lower emissions than under the original equilibrium, the permit price must rise. Note that 
allowing noncompliance by a subset of firms has two countervailing effects on monitoring costs. 
Monitoring effort is reduced for the noncompliant firms, but monitoring must increase for the 
compliant firms because the permit price is higher.  
There are two other costs associated with moving from a full compliance outcome. First, 
aggregate abatement costs will be higher, because individual firms’ marginal abatement costs are 
no longer equal; the marginal abatement costs of firms that hold permits are higher than for those 
who do not. Second, expected sanctioning costs increase from zero because some of the firms are 
now noncompliant.  
Clearly, if it is possible to improve on the full compliance equilibrium then the reduction in 
monitoring costs for the noncompliant firms must be larger than the increase in the monitoring 
costs of those firms that remain compliant, and the net reduction in monitoring costs must 
outweigh the increase in aggregate abatement costs and the expected costs of sanctioning the 
noncompliant firms. While this may be possible, it is probably so only under very limited 
circumstances. A rigorous derivation of the conditions under which it is possible to improve on 
the full compliance outcome with a policy that is designed so that some firms hold zero permits 
may be a worthwhile topic for future research.  
Under the assumption that all firms hold a positive number of permits, Propositions 1 and 2 
together suggests that the regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs 
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depends to a large degree on whether an increasing or constant marginal penalty is employed. In 
particular, a positive amount of noncompliance is only cost-effective if violations are punished 
with an increasing marginal penalty. Thus, the regulatory choice of noncompliance rests on a 
comparison of the costs of a policy with an increasing marginal penalty that allows for some 
noncompliance and a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty.  
To conduct this comparison consider a policy with a given increasing marginal penalty 
function ( ) ii f vv φ γ ′ =+ , and suppose that with this penalty function it is cost-effective to allow 
a positive amount of noncompliance. From part (2) of Proposition 1, individual violations, v, and 
the detection probabilities,  () / ( ) vp v π φγ =+ , are the same for each firm. Aggregate emissions 
are equal to the target E and the supply of permits is  . LEn v =−  Denote this policy as P.  
Now consider an alternative policy, denoted P
a, that achieves the emissions target, but with a 
constant marginal penalty and full compliance. Of course, given that the penalty schedule under 
policy P is fixed, P
a would trivially dominate P if we were free to choose an arbitrarily high 
constant marginal penalty. Doing so would not be informative, so let us place the two polices on 
equal footing by choosing the constant marginal penalty under P
a to be equal to the equilibrium 
marginal penalty under policy P. That is, letting 
a φ  denote the constant marginal penalty under 
policy P
a, 
a v φ φγ =+ . Given 
a φ , to induce the aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, 
Proposition 2 requires that the uniform detection probability under policy P
a are  /
aa p π φ =  and 
the aggregate supply of permits is 
a LE = . As usual, both policies minimize the aggregate 
abatement costs of holding emissions toE , so whether one is cheaper than the other rests on a 
comparison of their expected costs of enforcement. 
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In fact, monitoring costs under the two policies are the same. The detection probabilities are 
() / ( ) vp v π φγ =+  and  /
a p
a π φ =  under P and P
a, respectively. However, since 
a v φ φγ =+ , 
()
a v π π = .  Since monitoring effort, and hence monitoring costs, of the two policies are equal, 
they differ only in their expected sanctioning costs. Obviously, since policy P involves a certain 
amount of noncompliance and policy P
a does not, expected sanctioning costs are positive under 
P and zero under P
a. Therefore, total expected costs under policy P
a are lower than under policy 
P. Note that this will be true for lower constant marginal penalties as well. As 
a φ  is decreased, 
monitoring costs increase because monitoring effort must increase to maintain the equality 
/
a p
a π φ = . Policy P
a continues to dominate as 
a φ  is reduced as long as the increase in 
monitoring costs is less than the expected sanctioning costs under policy P. These results are 
summarized in the final proposition of this paper.  
 
Proposition 3: Consider an emissions trading policy that achieves an aggregate emissions target 
with a linearly increasing marginal penalty and allows for a positive amount of noncompliance. 
There are other policies with constant marginal penalties that do not exceed the equilibrium 
marginal penalty of this policy that induce full compliance and achieve the emissions target with 
lower expected costs. 
 
The policy significance of Propositions 2 and 3 is quite strong—there appears to be little 
justification for designing an emissions trading policy that allows a positive amount of 
noncompliance to the policy. Under the assumptions maintained throughout this work, the cost-
effective design of an emissions trading program should involve a constant marginal penalty that 
exceeds the expected equilibrium permit price by as much as is practicable; the supply of permits 
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should be equal to the aggregate emissions target, and monitoring should be sufficient to induce 
full compliance.  
 
5. Further Discussion: Uncertain Abatement Costs 
There is a difficulty with designing an emissions trading policy to satisfy an aggregate 
emissions standard when there is the potential for noncompliance that has not been addressed in 
this paper, but that is easily remedied.  To make sure that the firms’ aggregate emissions meet 
the aggregate standard, the expected marginal penalty must be equal to the aggregate marginal 
abatement cost function evaluated at the standard. In the case of a constant marginal penalty, this 
requires  () p CE πφ == − . Clearly, holding the firms’ emissions to the standard requires 
knowledge of the aggregate abatement cost function. Given a fixed marginal penalty, without 
complete information about the aggregate marginal abatement cost function the correct detection 
probabilities cannot be determined. Fortunately, this difficulty is easily overcome if the marginal 
penalty function is constructed to adjust with the equilibrium permit price.
15 Consider tying the 
marginal penalty to the permit price by letting  hp p φ = > , where h > 1 is a constant. Equating 
the expected marginal penalty to the permit price requires p πφ = =  hp π ; that is, the uniform 
detection probability is the constant  1/ . h π =  With monitoring in this way and a supply of 
permits L = E , the emissions target will be reached at least cost without any information about 
firms’ abatement costs. This approach works because the marginal penalty adjusts to aggregate 
marginal abatement costs through the equilibrium permit price.  
The ability to achieve an emissions target cost-effectively without knowledge of the 
aggregate marginal abatement cost function gives emissions trading programs an advantage over 
                                                 
15 This is in line with how penalties are to be determined in the EPA’s Clear Skies Initiative, which called for a unit 
penalty that is three times the clearing price in the most recent auction of permits (US EPA 2003b).   
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emissions standards and taxes when enforcement is costly and imperfect. Of course, an 
emissions tax will minimize aggregate abatement costs, and enforcement of the tax can be 
structured to eliminate sanctioning costs. However, to hold aggregate emissions to a fixed 
standard, the tax and the expected marginal penalty must be equal to the aggregate marginal 
abatement cost function at the standard, which requires complete information about abatement 
costs. An emissions trading policy can overcome this problem by tying the marginal penalty to 
the permit price. 
Sandmo (2002) has shown that it is possible to use imperfect enforcement to minimize 
aggregate abatement costs when firms face emissions standards. If all firms face a constant 
expected marginal penalty and all are noncompliant, then the expected marginal penalty serves 
as the emissions price that equates firms’ marginal abatement costs, thereby minimizing 
aggregate abatement costs. There are two disadvantages of this scheme. The first is the same 
problem of setting the correct emissions tax with incomplete information about abatement 
costs—to meet the aggregate emissions standard the expected marginal penalty must be set to the 
aggregate marginal abatement cost function at the desired aggregate standard.  The second 
problem is that this scheme incurs sanctioning costs, because equating marginal abatement costs 
under emissions standards requires that all firms be noncompliant. Designing an emissions 
trading policy to induce full compliance eliminates these costs. 
While it is straightforward to deal with uncertainty about abatement costs if the policy goal is 
to achieve an aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, it is not so easy to deal with uncertain 
abatement costs if emissions target itself is to be chosen optimally. In fact the fundamental 
results of this paper may not hold with that policy objective.  
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With complete information about abatement costs, a cost-effective policy of full compliance 
and a constant marginal penalty can easily be incorporated into the choice of the optimal 
emissions target. Suppose that emissions are uniformly mixed and cause damage that is 
characterized by an increasing and convex damage function D(E). The first-best environmental 
target is chosen to equate marginal damage to aggregate marginal abatement costs. With the 
necessity of enforcing an emissions trading program, however, the efficient environmental target 
is no longer first-best.  Suppose that a constant marginal penalty is employed.  Proposition 2 then 
implies that whatever level of aggregate emissions is chosen, it will be optimal to issue that 
number of permits and monitor firms to guarantee full compliance. The detection probability is 
/, p π φ =  where  ( ). p CE ′ =−  If the per-firm marginal cost of monitoring is  , µπ  total 
monitoring costs are  () /. nn C E µπµ ′ =− φ  The efficient level of emissions then minimizes the 
social cost function ( ) ( ) ( )/ . DE CE n C E µ φ ′ +−  Assuming that this is strictly convex, the 
efficient level of emissions is the solution to  ( ) ( ) ( )/ . DE CE nC E µ φ ′ ′′ ′ + =  Since this implies 
, the efficient level of emissions is greater than the first-best level. Moreover, the 
price of emissions, 
() () DE CE ′′ >−
( ), p CE ′ =−  is less than the Pigouvian price. Less control than first best is 
efficient, because the optimal choice of aggregate emissions internalizes the enforcement costs of 
maintaining this level of emissions. 
Clearly, complete information about abatement costs is required to determine the optimal 
level of aggregate emissions. Because of this the main result of this paper about the optimality of 
full compliance and a constant marginal penalty may not hold: optimality may actually call for 
allowing noncompliance and employing an increasing marginal penalty. Roberts and Spence 
(1976) have proposed a modification of an emissions trading program to include a “safety valve” 
tax. This tax reduces the welfare loss of a permit-trading program when aggregate marginal 
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abatement costs are underestimated, because it allows firms to pay a price to partially escape the 
burden of unexpectedly high abatement costs.  The expected marginal penalty could be 
constructed to serve this purpose, and could be chosen to allow noncompliance if marginal 
abatement costs turn out to be higher than expected.  Furthermore, an increasing marginal 
penalty schedule may be preferred to a constant marginal penalty.  The main benefit of Roberts 
and Spence’s mixed permit/tax policy is that it can be constructed to approximate the marginal 
damage schedule. If marginal damages are increasing, then an increasing expected marginal 
penalty could approximate it more closely than a constant expected marginal penalty.   
Montero (2002) has provided an interesting paper that links the insights of Roberts and 
Spence to imperfect compliance. He reexamined Weitzman’s (1974) comparison of price 
(emissions tax) and quantity instruments (tradable permits) under uncertainty and imperfect 
compliance, and found that the potential advantage of an emissions tax over a transferable permit 
system is significantly reduced by incomplete enforcement. The main reason is that under 
incomplete enforcement, a transferable permit system resembles the mixed transferable 
permit/tax scheme of Roberts and Spence. However, Montero assumes at the outset of his 
analysis that full compliance is never optimal, which, of course, runs contrary to the results of 
this paper. A potentially fruitful investigation for the future would reconsider the results of this 
paper when there is incomplete information about abatement costs, and then use the results to 
reexamine the prices versus quantity debate. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has addressed a fundamental environmental policy question: To achieve a fixed 
aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, should emissions trading programs be designed to 
achieve full compliance, or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of 
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reaching the emissions target?  Using a conventional model of emissions trading with common 
assumptions, I have argued that allowing noncompliance is only cost-effective if violations are 
punished with an increasing marginal penalty, but that any such policy is more costly than one 
that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty. The results of this work suggest a 
strong recommendation for designing emissions trading programs to meet a pre-determined 
environmental standard: the supply of permits should be equal to the aggregate emissions target, 
violations should be punished with a constant marginal penalty that exceeds the equilibrium 
permit price by as much as is practicable, and monitoring should be sufficient to induce full 
compliance. In addition, tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the 
regulator to achieve the aggregate emissions standard without any knowledge of the firms’ 
abatement costs. 
While the results of this paper are quite strong, they should be accompanied by certain 
caveats that deserve further attention. Several of these have been mentioned at various places in 
the paper, like the causes and consequences of monitoring and sanctioning costs that may vary 
across firms, the possibility that a cost-effective policy could call for a design in which some 
firms hold no permits, and the optimal choice of an environmental target when abatement costs 
are uncertain. Let me add just a few more. Reconsidering the results of this work when permit 
trading is imperfect because of market power or transaction costs may be a fruitful exercise. 
Furthermore, like most analysts, we’ve assumed that monitoring produces a perfect measure of 
emissions to determine its compliance status. However, in many situations in which emissions 
trading might be applied, monitoring errors are possible. Moreover, in many situations emissions 
cannot be measured directly and must be inferred from observable data on a firm’s operations. 
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These issues call for a more thorough look at the monitoring function of regulatory enforcement, 
and the ultimate consequences for the design and implementation of emissions trading programs.  
  29 
References 
Arguedas, Carmen and Hamid Hamoudi. 2004. Controlling Pollution with Relaxed Regulations.” 
Journal of Regulatory Economics 26(1): 85-104. 
Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Louis Kaplow. 1993. “Optimal Sanctions and Differences in 
Individual’s Likelihood of Avoiding Detection.” International Review of Law and Economics 
13: 217-224. 
Boemare, Catherine and Phillipe Quirion. 2002. “Implementing Greenhouse Gas Trading in 
Europe: Lessons from Economic Theory and International Experiences.” Ecological 
Economics 43: 213-230.    
Chavez, Carlos A. and Hugo Salgado. 2005. “ Individual Transferable Quota Markets under 
Illegal Fishing.” Environmental and Resource Economics 31(3): 303-324.  
Chavez, Carlos A. and John K. Stranlund. 2003. “Enforcing Transferable Permit Systems in the 
Presence of Market Power.” Environmental and Resource Economics 25 (1): 65-78.   
Chavez, Carlos A. and John K. Stranlund. 2004. “Enforcing Transferable Permit Systems in the 
Presence of Transaction Costs.” Department of Resource Economics, University of 
Massachusetts, Working Paper 2004-3.  
Garvie, Devon and Andrew Keeler. 1994.  “Incomplete Enforcement with Endogenous 
Regulatory Choice.”  Journal of Public Economics 55: 141-162. 
Hatcher, Aaron. 2005. Non-compliance and the Quota Price in an ITQ Fishery.” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 49(3): 427-436. 
Keeler, Andrew. 1991.  “Noncompliant Firms in Transferable Discharge Permit Markets: Some 
Extensions.”  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 21: 180-189. 
Macho-Stadler, Ines and David Perez-Castrillo. 2005. Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firm’s 
Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes. Forthcoming in Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management.  
Malik, Arun S. 2002. “Further Results on Permit Markets with Market Power and Cheating.” 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44(3): 371-90. 
Malik, Arun S. 1992.  “Enforcement Cost and the Choice of Policy Instruments for Controlling 
Pollution.”  Economic Inquiry 30: 714-721.  
Malik, Arun S. 1990.  “Markets for Pollution Control when Firms are Noncompliant.” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 18: 97-106. 
Montero, Juan-Pablo. 2002. “Prices versus Quantities with Incomplete Enforcement.” Journal of 
Public Economics 85: 435-454. 
Montero, Juan-Pablo, Jose Miguel Sanchez, and Ricardo Katz. 2002. A Market-Based 
Environmental Policy Experiment in Chile.” Journal of Law and Economics 45 (1): 267-287. 
Montgomery, W. David. 1972. “Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs.” 
Journal of Economic Theory 5 (3): 395-418. 
Murphy, James J. and John K. Stranlund. 2005. “A Laboratory Investigation of Compliance 
Behavior under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications for Targeted Enforcement.” 
Forthcoming in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell. 1992. “Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude 
and Probability of Fines.” Journal of Law and Economics 35(1): 133-148.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell. 2000. ”The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement 
of Law.” Journal of Economic Literature 38(1): 45-76
  30 
Roberts, M.J.  and M. Spence. 1976. "Effluent Charges and Licenses Under Uncertainty," 
Journal of Public Economics 5: 193-208. 
Sandmo, Agnar. 2002. “Efficient Environmental Policy with Imperfect Compliance.” 
Environmental and Resource Economics 23(1): 85-103.  
Stranlund, John K. and Kanwalroop K. Dhanda. 1999.  “Endogenous Monitoring and 
Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System.”  Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 38(3): 267-282. 
Stranlund, John K. and Carlos A. Chavez. 2000.  “Effective Enforcement of a Transferable 
Emissions Permit System with a Self-Reporting Requirement.”  Journal of Regulatory 
Economics 18(2): 113-131. 
Stranlund, John K., Christopher Costello, and Carlos A. Chavez. 2005. “Enforcing Emissions 
Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 28(2): 
181-204. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2004a. Acid Rain Program 2003 Compliance Report. 
Washington DC: U.S. EPA Acid Rain Program. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2004b. NOX Budget Trading Program: 2003 Progress 
and Compliance Report. Washington DC: U.S. EPA Office of Air and Radiation, Clean Air 
Market Programs. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2003a. Tools of the Trade: A Guide to Designing and 
Operating a Cap and Trade Program for Pollution Control. Washington DC: U.S. EPA 
Office of Air and Radiation.   
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2003b. Section-by-Section Summary of the Clear Skies 
Act of 2003. Washington DC: U.S. EPA Office of Air and Radiation. 
van Egteren, Henry and Marian Weber. 1996.  “Marketable Permits, Market Power, and 
Cheating.”  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30: 161-173. 
Weitzman, Martin. 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," Review of Economic Studies 41(4): 477-91. 
 
 
  31